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ABSTRACT: In an influential article published in 1982, Bas Van Fraassen developed an argument against causal realism 
on the basis of an analysis of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen correlations of quantum mechanics. Several 
philosophers of science and experts in causal inference —including some causal realists like Wesley 
Salmon— have accepted Van Fraassen’s argument, interpreting it as a proof that the quantum correlations 
cannot be given any causal model. In this paper I argue that Van Fraassen’s article can also be interpreted 
as a good guide to the different causal models available for the EPR correlations, and their relative virtues. 
These models in turn give us insight into some of the unusual features that quantum propensities might 
have. 
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1. The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) Correlations 
In 1935 Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen published their notorious paper1 describing a 
thought experiment with correlated entangled pairs of particles. The version of this 
experiment that has been most discussed, and gives rise to the real experiments that 
have actually been carried out, is due to David Bohm.2  
 In this Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-Bohm experiment two particles (“1” and “2”) 
with entangled states (because they have interacted in their past, or because they have 
been created simultaneously in the same decay event), move in opposite directions. In 
a Minkowski space-time diagram, both particles describe symmetric paths along the 
time axis (see figure 1). The initial angular momentum is zero, so their values of spin 
must be correlated throughout. Any particle’s spin can be measured by means of a 
Stern-Gerlach apparatus. (Essentially a magnetometer that impresses a force upon the 
particle proportional to its spin value, thereby correlating perfectly the particle’s 
position with its spin value at the time the particle interacts with the magnetometer. A 
Stern-Gerlach apparatus can be rotated along 360 degrees, in order to measure the 
particle’s spin value along any direction). 
 Each particle’s spin is measured in its corresponding wing of the experiment; the 
outcomes of each experiment are denoted by “s1” and “s2” —these are known as the 
“outcome-events”. (Lines “A1” y “A2” represent the world lines of both measurement 
apparatuses, which are at rest with respect to the laboratory frame). An important 
feature of the EPR-Bohm experiments is that these outcome-events are spacelike 
connected, i.e. they lie outside each other’s light-cone. Thus a signal from one event to 
 
                                                     
1 Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen, (1935). 
2 Bohm (1951, cap. 22). 
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Figure 1 
 
the other must travel at speed greater than the speed of light, during a finite part of its 
trajectory at least. As will be pointed out later, the implications of this fact with 
regards the special theory of relativity are both deep and complex, and have been the 
object of an intense debate.3
 According to quantum mechanics, there are only two possible values of spin in any 
direction of measurement (θ): positive spin (↑θ) and negative spin (↓θ). Quantum 
mechanics describes the spin state of the composite system of both particles at the 
time of emission and measurement by what is known as the singlet state: 
( )θθθθ 212121 ↑↓−↓↑=Ψ . 
(Here “1” and “2” refer to each particle.) The theory offers two kinds of probabilistic 
predictions. First, it offers predictions about the outcomes of measurements 
performed on each particle. To calculate these, we must first apply what is known as 
the axiom of reduction, which allows us to derive the state of each particle, 
individually taken, consistent with their being in the composite singlet state:4
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3 See e.g. Maudlin (1995).  
4 See Hughes (1989, pp. 149-150), Suárez (2004, appendix 1). 
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 Using these two states quantum mechanics allows us to make two types of 
predictions:  
 
1. Probabilities of outcomes of measurements carried out on each particle on any 
direction θ: 
( )
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2. Conditional probabilities of outcomes of measurements on either particle, 
conditional on any particular outcome of any measurement made on the other 
particle: 
 
 
 
( ) ( )( ) '.2121 21 1'21'2 θθθ θθθθ senprob
probprob =↑
↓∧↑=↓↑
 In the specific case θ = θ’: 
 ( ) ( )θθθθ 1212 1 ↑↓==↓↑ probprob , 
 ( ) ( )θθθθ 1212 0 ↑↑==↓↓ probprob . 
 
 It is clear then that if we measure both particles’ spin along the same direction, the 
singlet state predicts an anti-correlation between the spin values. If we measure the 
first particle’s spin in the θ direction, and we find the outcome corresponding to 
“positive” spin (↑θ), we can predict that the outcome of a later measurement of the 
second particle’s spin in the same direction will be “negative” (↓θ) with certainty. 
 In other words, the description offered by the singlet state ψ of the composite 
system contains the greatest possible amount of information about both systems. By 
contrast, if we only consider the states of the systems individually taken, W1 y W2, we 
can see that we have lost relevant information. Erwin Schrödinger was perhaps the 
first to note that “a portion of knowledge of the composite system” is found 
“squandered on conditional statements that operate between the subsystems.”5 The 
kind of necessity expressed by these statements, according to quantum mechanics, is 
nomological merely, and does not seem to be grounded on any physical process. The 
                                                     
5 Schrödinger (1933, p. 161). 
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quantum formalism at least does not describe any physical process capable of 
transmitting the information required from one system to the other. 
 A causal explanation of these correlations would have to introduce some type of 
mechanism, or an additional physical hypothesis to explain these conditional 
statements. In a causal model the “additional portion of knowledge” would not be 
“squandered in conditional statements.” For instance, in a model where the causes 
operate directly between the wings of the experiment, the “extra” portion of 
knowledge could be transmitted directly from one subsystem to the other by means of 
“mark-transmitters.”6
2. Correlations, “Forks” and Causal Processes 
In this paper I intend to defend the possibility of a causal explanation of the EPR 
correlations, one that would satisfy the conditions imposed by e.g. Wesley Salmon’s 
theory of causal explanation.7 It might help to review some of the main features of 
this theory. According to Salmon’s theory the typical target of a causal explanation 
(which constitutes its “explanandum”) is a statistical correlation between two event-
types A and B: 
( ) ( ) ( ).& BprobAprobBAprob ≠  
 This correlation might be explained by appeal to causal processes and their 
interactions, which jointly constitute the explanans. Salmon defines a process as a 
dynamical object that shows consistency of properties during its existence, and which 
can be represented as a world-line in four dimensional spacetime.8 The additional 
distinction between causal processes and pseudo-processes is notoriously problematic, 
and has been the object of a large number of subsequent modifications and changes.9 
Inspired by Reichenbach’s ideas, Salmon defines a causal process as a process capable of 
transmitting a “mark” —i.e. an alteration in the property of a process that results out 
of a single interaction. (According to Salmon, an interaction is an intersection of two 
processes that generates a change in the properties of both).  
                                                     
6 “Mark-transmitter” is the term employed by both Hans Reichenbach (1956, p. 198) and Wesley Salmon 
(1984, pp. 148-150). 
7 I take Salmon’s 1984 theory because it fits in well with Van Fraassen’s conditions. Salmon’s theory has 
since been subject to significant improvements and changes —see Dowe, 2000. But these ulterior de-
velopments in general have tended to strengthen logically the conditions on causal explanation. Hen-
ce virtually any model that satisfies the conditions of the 1984 theory will ipso facto satisfy those of 
later theories. This is the pragmatic reason why I presuppose Salmon’s 1984 theory throughout this 
paper —it should not be taken as a defence of this theory against later developments, or other theo-
ries of physical causation and explanation. 
8 Salmon (1984, pp. 139-147).  
9 See Salmon (1994). 
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 We then say that a process transmits a “mark” if that change of properties 
reappears in every point of spacetime contained in the remaining part of the process’ 
world line. 
 Interactions may be divided in three types, depending on the shape of the 
intersection that gives rise to them: 
 
Y-interactions: 
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X-interactions: 
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 Interactions are events in spacetime, which have the capacity to effect changes in 
the properties of certain dynamical objects. We have seen that the object of a scientific 
explanation, its explanandum according to Salmon, is a statistical correlation. Salmon’s 
1984 theory elaborates further some of Reichenbach’s original ideas, and adds the so-
called “forks” to the causal processes and causal interactions required for a typical 
explanans.  
Conjunctive Fork: 
i) P (A&B) > P(A) P(B) 
ii) P (A&B/C) = P(A/C) P(B/C) 
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According to this “fork”, in addition to the statistical correlation between events A 
and B, there is a screening-off relation between the explanatory common cause “C”, 
and the correlated events “A” and “B” that appear in the explanandum. This structure 
is perhaps more usual in y-interactions, where the type of event at the bifurcation 
doubles as a common cause. We will see later that this combination (y-interaction with 
a conjunctive fork structure) is particularly appropriate as a possible application to the 
EPR correlations. 
 
Interactive Fork: 
i) P(A&B) > P(A) P(B) 
ii) P(A&B/C) > P(A/C) P(B/C) 
In this structure the positive correlation between the events that we are trying to 
explain does not disappear when conditioned on the common cause. Salmon (1984, 
pp. 168-174) introduced this type of structure in order to extend his model of causal 
explanation to cover probabilistic common causes that do not satisfy screening-off. 
 
Perfect Fork: 
i) P(A&B) >P(A) P(B) 
ii) P(A&B/C) = 1 
This structure is simply the limiting case of the two other forks, with a common cause 
that ascribes probability one to the conjunction of the correlated events- and it is 
always fulfilled in the case: P(A/C) = 1 = P(B/C). 
 According to Salmon the explanans in a typical causal explanation has three 
different components. First, causal processes, which are the means of propagation and 
transmission of structure and causal order. Second, x-, y- or λ- causal interaction that 
satisfy the conditions on interactive forks, and help to modify causal structure. And, 
third, conjunctive common causes, i.e. the specific type of causal interactions that 
fulfil the conditions for a conjunctive fork, and are mainly responsible for the 
production of causal structure and order.10
 Salmon’s 1984 theory has proved itself to be a good model of the practice of 
causal explanation. The objections to the theory —including those powerful 
objections that have led Salmon himself to abandon the condition of mark 
transmission in favour of another condition based upon conservation principles— 
have been conceptual, not empirical.11 In Salmon’s writings there is to my knowledge 
only one mention of a possible empirical counterexample to the condition of mark-
                                                     
10 Salmon (1984, pp. 178-182). Salmon does not make clear whether these three components are neces-
sary for a causal explanation. It seems reasonable to suppose that (the explanans of) any causal 
explanation contains causal processes and at least one type of fork, conjunctive or interactive. 
11 Salmon (1994). 
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transmission. That is, only one example of a correlation that ought to be causally 
explained but can’t be given such an explanation in accordance to the mark-
transmission criterion: the EPR correlations from quantum mechanics. Salmon adopts 
Van Fraassen’s analysis and writes: 
Is it possible to provide causal explanations of quantum mechanical-phenomena? Van Fraassen 
argues cogently, on the basis of Bell’s inequality and relevant experimental results, that ‘there are 
web-attested phenomena which cannot be embedded in any common-cause model’.12
When we ask for the causal (or other sort of) mechanism involved in the production of the EPR 
correlations, we find ourselves at a loss.13
It is this type of remote conservation […] that is perplexing. By what mechanism, we feel 
compelled to ask, does nature contrive to insure the conservation of momentum in this remote 
case?14
 In other words, Salmon believes that the quantum correlations are a worrying case 
of empirically established correlation that does not admit treatment in accordance to 
his theory of causal explanation. The reference to Van Fraassen’s argument is explicit 
and heads this worry. I share Salmon’s worry: it would not be good news for a theory 
of explanation by means of physical causes, such as Salmon’s, if this theory was not 
applicable to the most notorious correlations predicted by the empirically most 
established theory in the history of physics.  
 One aim of this paper is to show that this suspicion is mistaken, thus rescuing and 
defending Salmon’s theory. Van Fraassen’s argument is often interpreted as a 
refutation of causal realism: this is the metaphysical thesis that states that every 
statistical correlation between observable or measurable quantities must have a causal 
explanation. My analysis is intended to show that Van Fraassen’s argument can also be 
employed as a very good overview and guide to the different alternatives and models 
of causal explanation. Specifically I aim to show that it is possible to offer models or 
causal explanations for the EPR correlations. Salmon himself wisely left an open door 
to this possibility: 
It would be premature, I believe, to conclude that causal explanations of quantum phenomena 
are impossible in principle […] The nature and role of causality in microphysics is a deep and 
difficult matter to sort out.15  
3. Causal Models for EPR Correlations 
Let us now return to our initial theme —the EPR correlations— as graphically 
represented in figure 1. It is possible in principle to provide two types of causal 
explanations for a correlation between two event-types A and B: a direct causal 
                                                     
12 Salmon (1984, p. 254). 
13 Salmon, (ibid, p. 251). 
14 Salmon (ibid, p. 256). 
15 Salmon (ibid, pp. 254-5). 
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relation between A and B, and a common cause structure, with a common cause C 
that underlies the correlation. 
3.1. Direct-Cause Models 
These models assume that the outcome-event in one wing of the experiment (s1) is a 
direct cause of the outcome-event in the other wing (s2): 
 
           “A1”        “A2” 
 
               “s2” 
 
     “3”                                              
        “s1”        “x” 
 
 
         “1”         “2”  
          “e” 
 
  
 
Figure 2 
 
 In this spacetime graph A1 and A2 represent the worldlines of the measurement 
devices; “1” y “2” represent those of the particles; and the line comprised between s1 
and x is the worldline of a direct causal process between the wings of the experiment. 
s1, s2, x and e denote event-types, where e is the particles’ emission event, and s1 y s2 are 
the outcome-events that result from measurements on particle “1” by device A1; and 
on particle “2” by device A2, respectively. x is the reception event by particle “2” of 
the causal influence emitted by particle “1”; and it constitutes a partial cause of the 
outcome s2.  
 This model satisfies the conditions on causal explanation imposed by Salmon’s 
1984 theory. The explanation of the correlation between s1 y s2 is given by four causal 
interactions and five partial causes (event-types that constitute a necessary 
contribution to the explanation of the correlation): 
“e”: y-interaction which produces both particles in state ψ. 
“s1”: λ-interaction between device “A1” and particle “1” which results in: i) 
outcome-event “1”, and emission of causal influence “3”.  
“x”: λ-interaction between the causal influence “3” and the particle “2” 
which changes the state of the particle. 
“s2”: λ-interaction between the particle “2” and the measurement device 
“A2”, resulting in outcome-event s2. 
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“e”: partial common cause of s1 and of x. 
“A1”: partial cause of s1.   “A2”: partial cause of s2. 
“s1”: partial cause of x.  “x”: partial cause of s2. 
3.2. Common-Cause Models 
There is yet another type of causal model, which asumes that the causal explanation of 
a correlation between events s1 and s2 is not the outcome of a direct causal influence 
but is given by a common cause “c”. This is connected by means of a series of causal 
processes with both events, and is implied to satisfy the following requirements: 
i) The common cause c is the emission event of both particles at the source. 
ii) The common cause lies in the past lightcone of both events s1 and s2. 
iii) The events c, s1 and s2 constitute a conjunctive fork —since c screens off  s1 
from s2: P (s1 & s2 / c) = P(s1 / c) P(s2 / c). 
iv) The causal influence of c on s1 y s2 is transmitted by the particles themselves 
along their trajectory. 
 This common cause model can be graphically represented thus: 
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Figure 3 
 In this diagram A1 and A2 again represent the measurement devices’ worldlines; 
“1” and “2” those of the particles, as well as the causal processes that transmit the 
corresponding mark. s1, s2 and c denote event-types, where “c” is the emission event 
and the partial common cause of s1 and s2, the outcome events on each wing. 
 This model too obeys the requirements laid out by Salmon in 1984. The 
explanation of the correlation between s1 and s2 is given by three causal interactions 
and three partial causes: 
“c”: y-interaction that generates at c two particles in state ψ. 
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“s1”: λ-interaction between the measurement device “A1” and the particle “1” 
that results in the outcome-event s1. 
“s2”: λ-interaction between the measurement device “A2” and the particle “2” 
that results in the outcome-event s2. 
c: type-event that constitutes the partial common cause of both s1 and s2, 
A1: partial cause of s1. 
A2: partial cause of s2.  
4. Arguments Against Causal Models for EPR 
There are as a matter of principle two different types of causal models that we might 
construct for the EPR correlations, both prima facie agreeing with the requirements 
imposed by Salmon. However, as already mentioned, Salmon expresses a strongly felt 
pessimism for the possibility of any causal mechanism for EPR. What exactly 
underlies this pessimism? In this section I would like to review briefly some of the 
main features of the most important arguments that have been presented against these 
models of EPR, namely Bas Van Fraassen’s; these arguments are often quoted by 
Salmon himself. In a later section I will reply to these arguments, providing a number 
of alternatives in order to defend the applicability of Salmon’s theory of causal 
explanation to the EPR correlations. 
4.1. The Relativistic Objection Against the Direct-Cause Model 
The most important objection against the direct-cause model is related to the theory 
of special relativity. Salmon leans heavily on Van Frassen’s argument against what Van 
Fraassen calls an “explanation by coordination” of the EPR correlations. Van Fraassen’s 
argument is a brief allusion to the superluminal character of the speed of the causal 
influence (represented by the worldline “3” in figure 2):16
By coordination I mean a correspondence effected by signals (in a wide sense): some energy or 
matter travelling from one location to another, and acting as a partial producing factor for the 
corresponding event. The situation need not be deterministic —there can be indeterministic 
signalling if the signal is not certain to arrive and / or not certain to have the required effect. But 
the word “travel” must be taken seriously. Hence this explanation cannot work for 
corresponding events with spacelike separation. To speak of instantaneous travel from X to Y is 
a mixed or incoherente metaphor, for the entity in question is implied to be simultaneously at X 
and at Y —in which case there is no need for travel, as it is at its destination already. 
 Let us analise this line of argument carefully. As we have already seen, figure 2 
represents a causal connection between the two wings of an EPR experiment. But we 
have already seen that in a typical EPR experiment, the outcome-events s1 and s2 are 
spacelike connected; so the causal influence “3” must travel at speed greater than light 
for at least a part of its trajectory. Now, let us suppose that the trajectory is exactly as 
                                                     
16 Van Fraassen (1982, in the expanded 1989 version, p. 112) 
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in figure 2, with the reception of the influence at x some time after its emission at s1, 
in the frame of reference with respect to which the laboratory is at rest.  
 According to the special theory of relativity, any inertial frame in movement with 
respect to the laboratory must be equally valid for describing the causal mechanism 
that explains the EPR correlations between s1 and s2. It is a well known fact that, 
according to the theory, the temporal order of two spacelike connected events is 
neither absolute nor independent of the frame of reference. There will therefore exist 
inertial frames of reference that will describe the mechanism very differently. For 
instance, in some frames the time lapsed between events s1 and x is longer than that 
which lapses between those same events in the laboratory frame of reference:  
 “A1”              “A2” 
 
                 “s” 
                                   
                “x” 
 
               “3” 
         “s1” 
 
    “1”         “2” 
                 “c” 
 
 
Figure 4 
 However, there are other inertial frames of reference, equally valid for the 
description of physical events, in which event s1 will be seen to occur after event x: 
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                 “c” 
 
 
Figure 5 
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 The existence of two inertial frames of reference that invert the temporal order of 
two events also entails the existence of a tirad frame of reference —intermediate 
between the two— in which the reception of the causal influence is instantaneous 
with its emission: 
 
    “A1”           “A2” 
 
 
  
     
 
         “s1”   “3”               “s2” 
              “x” 
 
     “1”  “2”  
                “c” 
 
 
 
Figure 6 
 
This is the scenario that worries Van Fraassen, for it implies the instantaneous 
coexistence of distant cause and effect, which appears to be incoherent with one 
seemingly necessary property of a causal influence, namely that it “travels”. 
4.2. Van Fraassen’s argument against Common Cause Models 
Van Fraassen’s argument against direct-cause models is thus very brief. The main part 
of his 1982 article is devoted to refuting the possibility of a common cause model, of 
the form shown in figure 3. Van Fraassen’s argument against common causes is based 
upon Reichenbach’s so-called principle of common cause: “If an improbable coincidence 
has occurred, there must exist a common cause.”17
 Two comments are in order regarding this principle. First, by “improbable” 
Richenbach does not simply mean a coincidence with a low prior probability. Rather, 
what he has in mind is a coincidence between two event-types A and B, which we do 
not have any reason to suppose have a direct mutual causal dependence, that is we 
have no reason to suppose that A causes B or B causes A. Secondly, according to 
Reichenbach, it is not the case that a coincidence is genuine if and only if it is lawlike, 
in some metaphysical sense. On the contrary, for Reichenbach a coincidence is 
genuine if it is an example of an empirically established correlation between two event 
types. 
                                                     
17 Reichenbach, 1956, p. 157 ff. 
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 The EPR correlations satisfy such requirements fully since they are experimentally 
verified and, in addition, are a precise prediction of quantum mechanics. The 
improbable coincidence is nothing but a statistical correlation between the outcome-
events of spin measurements in each wing of the experiment: 
( ) ( ) ( ).& 2121 sprobsprobssprob >  
 Van Fraassen’s argument introduces an additional complexity, since it considers 
the possible outcomes of spin measurements made on the particles with measuring 
devices’ settings in different directions. The experimenter must choose the direction 
of spin measurements on both particles, which need not agree in both wings. Let us 
suppose that the direction of measurements on the first particle is given by a certain 
angle θ, and the direction of measurement on the second particle by θ’. Van Fraassen 
denotes the setting-event by the first experimenter as “a” and that in the second 
experimenter as “b”. It should be clear that, in all frames of reference, a precedes s1 , 
and b precedes s2. 
 Van Fraassen’s argument aims to show that the Bell inequalities, and their 
experimental violation, imply that a common cause model for the EPR correlations is 
impossible. Bell employs a notorious probabilitistic condition, factorizability, as a 
condition of physical locality:18  
 
“Factorizability”: 
( ) ( ) ( ).&&&&& 2121 ΨΨ=Ψ bsprobasprobbassprob  
Van Fraassen analizes this condition as a conjunction of three logically independent 
further conditions, which he calls “causality”, “hidden locality”, and “hidden 
autonomy”, and which he defines as follows: 
 
“Causality”: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ).&&&&&
,&&&&&
212
121
Ψ=Ψ
Ψ=Ψ
basprobbassprob
basprobbassprob
 
This condition is a direct application of Reichenbach’s screening off. It states that the 
conjoint event (a & b & ψ) makes event s2 statistically irrelevant to the probability of 
s1, and viceversa. It has already been noted that, according to Reichenbach and 
Salmon, screening off is a necessary condition on a conjunctive fork. According to 
                                                     
18 Bell (1964, pp. 195-6), reprinted in Wheeler and Zurek (1983, pp. 403-4.). Bell’s identification of fac-
torizability with physical locality has been the object of a fascinating debate and controversy —see 
e.g. Suárez (2000) for a review and some references. Van Fraassen’s terminology should be equally 
controversial, since his terms (“causality”, “autonomy”, “locality”) suggest physical or causal facts, 
when the truth conditions of these three expressions are strictly probabilistic. 
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this point of view, if this condition is not satisfied, then the conjunction (a & b & ψ) 
can not be a common cause of the conjunctive fork variety. 
 
“Hidden Locality”: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ).&&&
,&&&
22
11
Ψ=Ψ
Ψ=Ψ
bsprobbasprob
asprobbasprob
 
This condition is also a screening off condition, which now states that the conjunction 
of the state ψ of both particle, with the setting-event in the direction of measurement 
in the nearby wing makes the setting-event in the far away device irrelevant to the 
probability of the outcome-event in the nearby wing. 
 
“Hidden Autonomy”: 
( ) ( ).& Ψ=Ψ probbaprob  
This condition establishes that the probability of the particles to be in a particular state 
ψ at the time of their emission is independent of the selection of the setting-events in 
either wing. 
 Van Fraassen then shows that the conjunction of causality, hidden locality and hidden 
autonomy implies Bell’s factorizability condition, which in turn gives rise to the 
inequalities violated by experimental results as well as the quantum mechanical 
predictions. Since factorizability must be false, one of these three conditions (or some 
logical conjunction of them) must similarly be false. 
 Van Fraassen provides us with the following argument in favour of hidden autonomy 
and hidden locality —with the ultimate end in mind to place the blame on causality:19
If the probability of a given outcome at [one wing] is dependent not merely on the putative 
common cause, but also on what happens at [the other wing], or if the character of that putative 
common cause itself depends on which experimental arrangement is chosen (even after the 
source has been constructed) then I say that the two-outcome events have not been traced back 
to a common cause which explains their correlation. 
 In other words, according to Van Fraassen there might be common-cause models 
in which hidden locality and / or hidden autonomy fail, but these models would not 
constitute common cause explanations of the correlations. If on the other hand causality 
fails then common cause models are just not viable, since this condition embodies the 
application of Reichenbach’s principle. Van Fraassen then goes to argue that the EPR 
correlations themselves show causality to be false. This is because the state of the 
particles at the time of their emission does not screen off the outcome-events from 
each other. For, let us suppose that a = b = θ, without loss of generality. Then causality 
reduces to: 
                                                     
19 Van Fraassen (1982, in its corrected and extended version 1989, p. 105). 
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( ) ( )
( ) ( ).&
,&
212
121
Ψ=Ψ
Ψ=Ψ
sprobssprob
sprobssprob
 
 And this condition is certainly false, since according to quantum mechanics: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) .211&
,2
11&
212
121
=Ψ≠=Ψ
=Ψ≠=Ψ
sprobssprob
sprobssprob
 
 Van Fraassen thus concludes that a common cause model for EPR of the sort 
envisioned by Reichenbach is not viable:20
 
“The conclusion is surely inevitable: there are well attested pehnomena which cannot be 
embedded in any common-cause model.” 
5. Replies and Alternatives 
My exposition so far is already geared towards a particular conclusion. In particular in 
the last section, in reviewing the arguments against causal models for the EPR 
correlations, I have been anticipating several replies and possible alternatives. In this 
section I point out these alternatives explicitly and develop them into sketches of a 
range of possible causal models of EPR. I leave for later work the technical 
development of these sketches into mathematically sophisticated causal models. In 
this paper I only aim to argue that all these models (of either the direct or common 
cause varieties) have not yet been shown inconsistent with the experimental results. 
Of course this does not amount to a proof that one among these models is a literal 
and true description of the causal mechanism underlying the EPR correlations; it only 
entails that there is no proof to the contrary. This conclusion should not be surprising, 
in my view: causal models are generally metaphysical or ontological interpretations of 
physical phenomena, and it ought not surprise us to find that such interpretations are 
under-determined by the empirical outcomes, i.e. by the statistical correlations 
between observable or measurable quantities. 
5.1. In Favour of Direct-CauseModels 
There are at least three different replies to the relativistic argument against direct-
cause models. The first considers the possibility of causal influences without a material 
or physical basis; the second questions the requirement that quantum phenomena be 
Lorentz-invariant; the third admits the possibility of backwards causation in time. Let 
us consider them in turn. 
5.1.1. The causal influence might not have a material basis 
It is true that there exists a frame of reference where a direct-causal influence between 
the wings will be instantaneous (see figure 6). However, an instantaneous causal 
                                                     
20 Van Fraassen (1982, in the 1989 version, p. 108). 
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influcence need not be incoherent. Van Fraassen is right to claim that if a physical 
object is in two locations in space at the same time, it would not make sense to 
suppose that it has “travelled” from one location to the other. But the direct cause 
model does not necessarily imply that there is a displacement of a physical or material 
object from one wing to the other. The causal influence is transmitted from one location 
to the other: this only implies that a material object is in two places at once if the 
causal influence can only be transmitted by means of the displacement of a physical 
object. 
 There are several sophisticated and well known theories of causation available 
nowadays, which do not require the existence of a physical object in order to transmit 
the causal influence.21 As a matter of fact in many of these theories, the 
“instantaneous transmission of causal influence”, suitably understood, is not only 
possible, but desirable (suitably understood —the terms “transmission” or “influence” 
should be understood as devoid of a physical connotation). In recent years, several 
convincing arguments have been developed in favour of the claim, specific to 
quantum mechanics, that the causal influence that might be operating in EPR does 
not transmit itself through any material displacement.22
 To sum up, the first reply is that causal influence need not require material 
transmission or physical displacement. If so, Van Fraassen’s argument, based upon the 
impossibility of an instantaneous physical displacement would have no consequences. 
(This reply also allows prima facie for the compatibility of a direct-cause model with 
special relativity). However, it must be admitted that on this interpretation the direct-
cause model would not be a genuine causal explanation according to Salmon’s theory. 
This is not a counterfactual theory of causation, but a physical theory, which seeks a 
material or physical entity —a causal process— as the basis of the transmission of any 
causal influence. 
5.1.2. Causal processes might be non-relativistic 
The second reply denies that the causal model that explains the EPR correlations need 
be Lorentz-invariant. Why should we suppose that quantum processes must obey the 
special theory of relativity? Several extant interpretations of quantum mechanics 
already clearly abandon the requirement of relativistic invariance at the ontological or 
causal level. A very well known case is Bohm’s theory, whose wave equations 
(corresponding to the “quantum field”) are not invariant under the Lorentz 
transformations.23 Another widely debated and established case is the modal 
                                                     
21 Perhaps the best known is the counterfactual theory due to David Lewis (1986). Psillos (2002, cap. 3) is 
a clear and concise introduction to this type of theory. 
22 Maudlin (1995, cap. 5) is an excellent defence of this point of view. 
23 Cushing (1995) also emphasises the distinction between fundamental and phenomenological invari-
ance. According to Cushing, Bohm’s theory is committed to a phenomenological reading of the spe-
cial theory of relativity which does not require fundamental invariance. This is a reading congenial to 
my second alternative proposal for interpreting the direct-cause model for EPR. 
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interpretation, which postulates stochastic transitions between the so-called value 
states, which are not Lorentz-invariant.24  
 If we abandon the commitment to Lorentz-invariance, we could go on to suppose 
that the causal process that connects both wings of the experiment determines a 
privileged frame of reference; any other frame would be a fictitious one. In Jim 
Cushing’s (1995) terminology, the theory of relativity would be a phenomenological 
theory, not a fundamental one, with respect to quantum causal processes. The 
statistical frequencies of the EPR experiments, including the correlations, would be 
invariant under the Lorentz-transformations, but the causal processes that explain 
these correlations would not be so. The determination of the privileged frame of 
reference might become an empirical matter. We could provisionally suppose that the 
privileged frame is the one in which the first measurement device is at rest, 
corresponding to figure 2. There does not seem to be a reason, from the perspective 
of Salmon’s theory of causal explanation, to deny this second possibility. 
5.1.3. Causal influences might be transmitted backwards in time 
The third reply would insist on the Lorentz-invariance of quantum causal processes, 
and would accept fully its consequences. The main consequences, as we have already 
seen, are the existence of a frame in which the causal influence is instantaneous (figure 
6), and other frames in which the influence travels back in time (figure 5). 
 Let us consider both consequences in turn. The first entails the incoherence noted 
by Van Fraassen, which we can only get around now by abandoning the familiar 
meanings associated with “transmission”, “travel”, and “influence”. The special theory 
of relativity would imply that the “transmission” of causal influence is not an objective 
physical fact of the situation, since whether there is “transmission” in this sense or not 
is a frame-dependent issue. But this does not imply that the existence of the causal 
process between the outcome-events is frame-dependent, on Salmon’s definitions. For 
it was already noted (in section 2) that these terms have a rather technical meaning in 
Salmon’s theory. It is still the case that in every frame —including the frame with 
instantaneous causation— there is a four dimensional worldline that exhibits 
consistency of properties, and which transmits a mark in the technical sense invoked 
by Salmon, and explained in section 2 above. We would still have a perfectly legitimate 
causal process in that frame —what would be illegitimate is to describe this process as 
a “transmission” of “influence” in the familiar sense of these words. 
 The second consequence that this third line of reply would have to accept is the 
fact that the causal influence would travel back in time in some further frames of 
reference. The argument in the previous paragraph comes to show that there is no 
reason why we should not speak of “causal processes transmitting marks” in these 
frames, as long as we stick to Salmon’s technical definitions. But there is certainly an 
added difficulty which relates to the coherence of backwards in time causation. Does 
the concept make sense? Can it apply to EPR? Fortunately these questions have 
                                                     
24 See Dickson and Clifton (1998). 
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positive answers. For a start the traditional arguments against backwards in time 
causation have been long refuted.25 In addition, several causal models for the EPR 
correlations that make use of the hypothesis of backwards in time causation have 
already been developed. These models go further than the present alternative since 
they make use of backwards in time causation in the most familiar reference frame: the 
frame with respect to which the laboratory itself and all measurement devices are at 
rest.26  
 It is of course possible that these models, which use the hypothesis of backwards 
in time causation, will eventually be proved implausible or extravagant; but an 
empirical refutation of these models does not seem likely. (In my opinion, these models 
are as plausible as any other model or interpretation of quantum mechanics presently 
debated; and they would in any case be at least as plausible as the hypothesis 
according to which the correlations are a brute fact of nature, lacking in any 
explanation). Contrary to what Salmon and Van Fraassen claim, it is still perfectly 
possible to explain the correlations by means of direct-causal processes that in every 
way agree perfectly with the requirements of Salmon’s theory. 
5.2. In Favour of Common Cause Models 
Let us quickly review Van Fraassen’s argument against common cause models. Its first 
premise is (Pr1): hidden locality and hidden autonomy could hold in a common cause 
model, but these models would not explain the correlations. The other premises are 
(Pr2): causality must necessarily hold for such a model to be viable, and (Pr3): The 
violation of Bell’s inequalities itself tells us that causality is actually false. The 
conclusion Van Fraassen draws is thus (iv): no common cause model for the EPR 
correlations is viable. I will argue that the argument is valid but not necessarily sound: 
the premisses are all controversial and (Pr1), in particular, seems likely to be false. 
 We have seen how the common cause models that Van Fraassen considers and 
rejects make several assumptions (assumptions (i-iv) in section 3.2.) Van Fraassen 
does not make explicit at least three of these assumptions (assumption (iii) is made 
explicit to the extent that it is required that any common cause must be a screener 
off). However, neither of these assumptions are equivalent to —nor a logical 
consequence of— any of the requirements established by Salmon’s theory for a causal 
explanation. The following question arises: Would it be possible perhaps to construct 
causal models for EPR that satisfy Salmon’s requirements but do not satisfy any of 
these additional assumptions? Let us carefully scrutinise the different possibilities. 
 
 
                                                     
25 By Dummett (1954) and Horwich (1987) among others. 
26 Costa de Beauregard (1977) is one of the first EPR models of this kind. Currently the best-known mo-
del of this sort is probably Huw Price’s (1996, cap. 9). In this model the setting-event in each wing of 
the experiment is a cause of the state of the particles as they are emitted. (As I point out later on, this 
model violates Van Fraassen’s hidden autonomy).  
 
Causal processes and propensities in quantum mechanics 289 
5.2.1. The common cause might be an interactive fork 
Let us begin by considering assumption (iii) which is arguably the most controversial, 
in addition to being the only one explicitly acknowledged by Van Fraassen. Van 
Fraassen insists, following Reichenbach, that any common cause C of two correlated 
effects A and B must obey the screening off condition: 
P (A&B/C) = P(A/C) P(B/C) 
 According to both Reichenbach and Van Fraassen, screening off is a necessary 
condition —albeit not sufficient— for a common cause. Why? We have already seen 
that Salmon himself allows for interactive as well as conjunctive forks. Can a common 
cause fail to satisfy screening off? Some philosophers think so in the case of genuinely 
probabilistic causes —for example Nancy Cartwright.27 If Cartwright is right then 
premise (Pr2) in Van Fraassen’s argument is false. I will not take sides on this issue —
which is at the heart of the contemporary debate related to the Markov Causal 
Condition, a debate that does not fall within the scope of this paper.28 But it is worth 
pointing out that if we abandon Reichenbach’s screening off requirement then the 
common cause of the EPR correlations could be the very state of the particle pair at 
the time of their emission considered and rejected by Van Fraassen.29
5.2.2. The common cause might not be the emission event 
Assumption (i) could also be false —and Van Fraassen’s argument could consequently 
be invalid. This would happen for instance if the common cause was an event prior to 
the emission event of the particles (for instance the creation event of the source itself, 
or the preparation event of the particle pair at the source). As far as I know this type 
of model has never been studied or proposed. But it is hard to understand why, since 
it constitutes a typical hidden variable model. What’s more —it could be constructed 
in such a way as to satisfy the screening off condition, like a classical conjunctive fork.  
 Perhaps the reason why this model has never been developed is the inherent 
difficulty in identifying some event d in the proper past of c, s1 y s2 that can play the 
role of a hidden common cause. But perhaps the reason has rather to do with the 
suspicion that if this event or hidden variable was to satisfy Reichenbach’s conditions, 
it would necessarily have to satisfy the factorizability condition, which would imply a 
commitment to the Bell inequalities. This reasoning does not strike me as convincing, 
however, for the following reason. There does not seem to be any reason why, if there 
was a common cause or hidden variable, this cause could not be a partial cause of 
each of the outcome-events, and in addition a partial cause of the setting-events a and b 
(although these events lie outside the future light cone of c, they can nevertheless lie 
within the future light cone of d, since d is in the proper past of c). Moreover, d could 
                                                     
27 Cartwright (1988). 
28 See, for instance, Hausman and Woodward (1999). Some of the issues debated have already had appli-
cation to EPR —by, for instance, Hofer-Szabo, Redei and Szabo (1999). 
29 Cartwright (1989, cap. 9) sketches a model of this type. 
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be a partial cause of the emission event c, which could in turn be a partial cause of the 
outcome-events. In other words, there does not seem to be any reason to exclude a 
complex causal structure of the following type: 
 
    “A1”                                                                             “A2”   
 
                                                                                 “s2”                              
                      “s1” 
 
 
 
 “a”                      “b” 
              “c” 
 
  
              “d”  
 
Figure 7 
 
 In this causal structure: d is the partial common cause of c, a, b, s1, s2; c is the partial 
common cause of s1, s2; a is the partial cause of s1; b is the partial cause of s2. These 
“common causes” can not be expected to form a conjunctive fork by themselves. 
That is: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ).&
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 However, the conjunction of both might (or might not) satisfy factorizability: 
( ) ( ) ( ).&&&&&&&& 2121 dcbsprobdcasprobdcbassprob =  
In this case, Bell’s inequalities are not derivable with respect to each isolated common 
cause, even if they might be derivable with respect to the logical conjunction of 
both.30
5.2.3. The common cause might lie outside the light-cone  
The second supposition might also be false. The common cause might not be a 
discrete event, and need not lie outside the light cone of s1 and s2. Specifically, the 
common cause might be the state of the two particles just prior, in the laboratory 
frame, to the first outcome-event. Since the two particles are physically separated from 
                                                     
30 In other words: whether or not this model is empirically adequate is a distinct and different question to 
the one addressed by Van Fraassen’s argument regarding the empirical adequacy of a model that has 
only c as a possible common cause. 
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each other, the spacetime location of the state must be a hyperplane, or at least a 
(presumably closed) region of such a hypersurface that contains the physical position 
of both particles at that time just prior to the first outcome-event.31 For instance: 
 
“A1”       “A2” 
 
               “s2” 
 
    “s1”           “c” 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 8 
 
5.2.4. The causal influence might not be transmitted with the particles 
The causal influence’s trajectory might not correspond to that of any of the particles. 
For instance, it is possible to suppose that, even if both particles’ trajectories were 
classical and continuous, the causal influence could exhibit important discontinuities 
in space and / or time. It is not necessary here to broach the details of this option.32 It 
is enough to mention that such a supposition is not alien to the history of quantum 
mechanics. On the contrary —it seems to agree with the spirit of the orthodox 
interpretation of quantum mechanics, the Copenhagen interpretation, according to 
which it is not legitimate to ascribe a classical or continuous trajectory in spacetime 
even to quantum particles themselves. 
5.2.5. “Hidden autonomy” might be false 
I have already mentioned (footnote on page 25) that this condition is false in the 
models of backwards in time causation of Costa de Beauregard and Huw Price. In 
these models (sometimes referred to as “zigzag models”) the setting-event in any of 
the wings is causally related to the state of the particles as they are emitted at the 
source. Specifically the setting-events are a partial cause of the initial state of the 
particles —an earlier event in the laboratory frame: 
 
 
 
                                                     
31 Jeremy Butterfield (1989) explores some of these possibilities. 
32 I discuss it in Suárez (2000c, p. 9). Chang and Cartwright (1993) develop a model of this kind. 
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Figure 9 
 
 In other words, hidden autonomy is false in these models: 
( ) ( ).& Ψ≠Ψ probbaprob  
 Van Fraassen’s premise (Pr1) entails that these models can not provide 
explanations of the correlations. The plausibility of these models can indeed be 
questioned; but in so far as they are plausible, they seem prima facie as explanatory of the 
correlations as any other common cause model.  
5.2.6. “Hidden locality” might be false 
There is a further causal possibility. Van Fraassen’s hidden locality can also be false in a 
legitimate common cause model of the EPR correlations. It is possible to suppose that 
a setting-event in one wing is a partial cause of the outcome-event in the opposite 
wing. In such a case: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ).&&&
,&&&
22
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bsprobbasprob
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 As I already noted Van Fraassen claims that if this condition were false then “the 
two-outcome events have not been traced back to a common cause which explains 
their correlation.”33 Van Fraassen is quite right that, in a model that violates hidden 
locality, the correlation can not be explained only by means of a common cause. But it 
does not follow from that there can not exist a common cause as a part of the full 
causal structure that explains the correlations. For instance, the outcome events might 
be partially caused by the action of the common cause, and partially caused by the 
setting-events. In other words, Van Fraassen’s reasoning is not meant to exclude the 
                                                     
33 Van Fraassen (1982, in the 1989 version, p. 105). 
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following causal structure, which is perfectly compatible with Salmon’s theory of 
causal explanation: 
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Figure 10 
 
5.3. The Status of Causal Realism 
In spite of efforts to carefully exclude all causal explanations of the EPR correlations, 
the alternatives available —in the form of several models— are many and diverse. 
Some of these causal models are more plausible than others; but none has so far been 
excluded by the experimental results. Experiments might be designed in the future to 
refute empirically one or another particular model. For that task Van Fraassen’s 
argument is an excellent tool, since it constitutes a useful guide for sorting out the 
models into different classes. It seems very implausible though that all causal models 
of the EPR correlations will ever be refuted. It would arrogant on my part to claim to 
have given a full account of the possibilities, and there are no limits to the imagination 
in this regard. For instance, we could go on to consider all kinds of hybrid proposals: 
direct causal relations between the wings superposed with common causes, etc. All of 
these alternatives seem compatible with Salmon’s theory of causal explanation, since 
they explain the correlations on the basis of a combination of causal processes, 
different types of causal interactions, and forks. Van Fraassen’s argument seems to 
have induced on Salmon an unfounded pessimism regarding the prospects of the 
latter’s theory of causal explanation. 
 Perhaps one day the thesis of causal realism will be shown to be untenable: There 
are some interesting and persuasive philosophical arguments to the effect that causal 
realism is neither necessary nor inevitable.34 But “dispensible” and “false” are different 
properties. It seems to me to be part of the metaphysical character of a metaphysical 
                                                     
34 Fine (1989) is an excellent defence of the dispensability of causal explanations for EPR, without at-
tempting an empirical refutation of such explanations. 
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thesis that it can not be empirically refuted. So it does not seem unreasonable to 
suppose that no experimental reasons could ever force us to abandon causal realism.35
6. Propensities and Causal Models 
In this final section I would like to broach briefly a further issue, in order to display 
one way in which Van Fraassen’s argument can be a very useful tool. My claim —
which there is only space to develop in its bare essentials here— is that the 
classification of causal models that has emerged in the previous section can help 
distinguish different notions of quantum propensities and their features. Let us 
assume that whatever causal model underlies EPR is in effect a description of the 
workings of quantum propensities; i.e. let us assume that the relata of these causal 
relations are (often, not always) propensities. (This is of course an additional 
assumption to Wesley Salmon’s theory —which does not per se require propensities to 
constitute the causal relata of any causal laws or relations— but as I intend to show in 
what follows, it is compatible with it). Thus the probability distributions that appear in 
these models are nothing but the manifestations or displays of quantum dispositional 
properties, or propensities. Specifically: the probability distributions over the 
outcomes of spin measurements on each wing are the manifestations or displays of 
quantum propensities in particular experimental set-ups.36 What would the causal 
models studied in section 5 imply regarding these dispositions or propensities? 
 At this point I need to make explicit one assumption regarding the underlying 
ontology of dispositional properties, or propensities, that I will be employing. The 
assumption is neither necessary nor universal, but it is in line with the bulk of the 
philosophical literature on dispositions:37 Dispositions, and propensities, are not 
properties of the experimental set-ups designed to test them, but rather properties of 
the systems themselves under test. The ascription of these properties is thus 
independent of whatever experimental arrangement these systems find themselves in. 
These arrangements simply serve to extract manifestations, or displays, of dispositions 
or propensities, but do not determine their possession by any entity or system. Hence 
each individual EPR particle will possess propensities of its own independently of the 
measurements that we decide to make on them.38 I leave it open, however, whether in 
addition the combined system of both particles can be ascribed its own propensities 
                                                     
35 It is in my view puzzling that Van Fraassen —whose constructive empiricism is so openly sceptical re-
garding the possibilities of any metaphysics— would invest such effort in the empirical refutation of 
a metaphysical thesis. It seems to me that the natural position for a constructive empiricist to adopt is 
the one I adopt in this paper: a combination of suspension of judgement (analogous to religious ag-
nosticism) regarding the ultimate structure of reality; and open scepticism about our chances to refute 
or confirm empirically a metaphysical thesis such as causal realism. 
36 See Mellor (1974). 
37 It is contrary to Popper (1957), but in line with the theories of Martin (1994), Mellor (1974), Mumford 
(1998). 
38 For an interpretation of quantum mechanics along these lines, see Suárez (2004). 
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—i.e. propensities that neither reduce to, nor supervene on, the properties of the 
individual particles. (This will turn out to be a useful assumption in some of the 
common cause models). If it can, then these propensities too will satisfy the condition 
above and will be possessed even in the absence of any experimental arrangements.  
 I will be making no further assumptions regarding the nature or correct analysis of 
propensities. In particular, I will commit myself to neither a realist account in terms of 
natures or essences, nor an empiricist analysis in terms of conditionals with test-
conditions for their manifestations in the antecedents; instead I’ll freely help myself to 
either of these views whenever I find them suitable.39
6.1. Propensities for direct-causes 
In section 5.1. I defended three alternative lines of defence, or interpretations, of a 
direct cause model between s1 and x in EPR. The direct causal influence (i) might not 
have a material basis; (ii) it might be non-relativistic; or (iii) it might travel backwards 
in time —in some frame of reference. Each of these interpretations suggests a 
different understanding of the propensities that may underlie the experiment. 
 In the first case, for instance, the causal relation can be understood to be a mere 
conjunction of true counterfactuals à la Lewis. For it is then true that: “had s1 not 
been the case, it would not have been the case that x”, and also that: “had x not been 
the case, it would not have been the case that s2”. Even if counterfactual dependence 
is not generally transitive, it is also the case in the context of this direct cause model 
that: “had it not been the case that s1, it would not have been the case that s2”. The 
(partial) cause s1 might even have its effect x instantaneously and at a distance (as in 
figure 6). On a propensity-based reading of causal influences, we may then say that the 
outcome-event s1 endowes —via event x— particle 2 with a certain propensity that 
displays itself —when appropriately tested by the appropriate device— in a probability 
distribution over a range of possible (spacelike related to s1) outcome-events s2. Notice 
then that on this reading the causal influence has the effect of changing some hitherto 
untested propensities of the distant particle; these propensities then reveal themselves, 
upon the appropriate test, in a probability distribution. Since the causal influence is 
here analysed counterfactually it might seem that a conditional analysis of propensities 
would work best. We would then say that event s1 ‘endowes’ particle 2 with a 
propensity to s2 if and only if: were particle 2 to undergo a subsequent spin measurement by 
measuring device A2 it would yield outcome event s2 with probability Pψ (s2 / s1 ). This 
conditional statement is true within the direct-cause model represented in figure 2, 
since event x is a necessary partial cause of the display of the statistics predicted by 
quantum mechanics.  
 A realist account of propensities is more appropriate for the two other 
interpretations of a direct cause model. The second interpretation takes it that the 
                                                     
39 Although the conditional analysis of macroscopic dispositional properties suffers from severe difficul-
ties to do with finks and antidotes, it has a better chance in the case of fundamental, and hence irre-
ducible, dispositional properties —see Bird (this volume). 
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causal influences underlying the correlations have a fundamental physical basis, but 
this fundamental basis ought not be understood in a spacetime context, or at least not 
a special relativistic one. Special relativity is here taken as a phenomenological theory 
only, which does not apply to the underlying causal relations. But if it fails to apply to 
the causal relations then it is hard to see how or why it would apply to the exercise of 
the propensities, which are just as ‘fundamental’. To be more precise: if the causal 
relation (whereby the measurement outcome-event s1 on particle 1 effects a change x 
in the propensities of particle 2) is not subject to the constraints of special relativity, 
then it is hard to see why the subsequent manifestation of particle 2’s propensities (i.e. 
the displaying of the right probability distribution over outcome-events s2 under the 
right kind of test) should be relativistic. This remains so even if x is a physical event 
that endowes particle 2 with an irreducible property, realistically construed. 
 Finally, on the third reading of the direct cause model, relativity applies fully and 
we are required to accept that the causal influence between s2 and x travels backwards 
in some frame(s) of reference. So on this reading the manifestation of s2’s subsequent 
propensity must itself be relativistic, i.e Lorentz invariant. Would this be a problem? I 
don’t think it would, as long as we are referring to the process whereby particle 2’s 
propensities are exercised in s2 in order to display the correct probability distribution. 
For the manifestation of the propensity is instantaneous at s2. It would be a 
completely different thing if the propensity was, like the causal connection between s1 
and s2 exercised at a distance. But I can see no reason to insist on particle 1 having 
propensities to yield outcome-events on measurements on particle 2. There is just the 
need for a causal connection whereby event s1 can change the propensities of particle 
2 at event x, but this is a casual connection between occurrent events, and need not be 
understood as the exercise of any dispositional property. 
6.2. Propensities and common causes 
In section 5.2 I presented six different sketches for a common cause model of the 
EPR correlations. Let me now discuss how best to understand them by means of 
quantum propensities. One general feature that many of these models share is the 
following: it will be natural to ascribe the propensities to a larger system that 
comprises both particles, in addition to or in place of the propensities of the individual 
particles. This is most clear in the model developed in section 5.2.3 (figure 8). In this 
model a hypersurface (or part thereof) that comprises both particles after they have 
been ejected from the source is the common cause of both outcome-events s1 and s2. 
The propensities responsible for the probability distribution displayed must then be 
properties possessed by the whole hypersurface (or part thereof). It is in reaction to 
these propensities of the hypersurface that the right probability distributions over s1 
and s2 will be displayed. 
 The model described in section 5.2.1 presents us with a very different account 
where the common cause is a discrete event (the emission event at the source). Often 
however this event is represented as the quantum state of the particle pair at the time 
of their emission, ψ. So if we are going to suppose that the distribution over the 
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outcome events is a display of underlying propensities at the time of emission, we 
seem forced to suppose that these propensities are properties of the combined system. 
But one advantage of the model in 5.2.1. is that, unlike the model considered 
previously in figure 8, the propensities so ascribed will be possessed by the particle-
pair as they are generated at the source, hence they are located at one particular point 
of spacetime —which is arguably the standard view of propensities and dispositional 
properties. Moreover, the notion of propensitiy per se draws no conceptual distinction 
between propensities of a common cause that underlie conjunctive forks and those 
that underlie interactive forks, since the only requirement for their possession —that 
they both lay out the appropriate probability distributions over their effects— is 
satisfied in both cases. Thus the propensitiy picture prima facie supports critics of the 
conjunctive fork criterion. 
 There is, however, a counterintuitive feature of the propensities invoked to explain 
the model in 5.2.1. These propensities manifest themselves across a spacetime gap, as 
it were: it is the propensities of the whole combined system at the time of emission that 
manifest themselves later on as the probability distributions over outcome-events at 
the time of measurement. This is a bizarre but apparently coherent kind of what we could 
call “nonlocal propensity”: a dispositional property of a quantum entity placed in 
some spacetime location that can manifest itself at a different spacetime location.40 In 
order to avoid this bizarre feature, one might be tempted to postulate some kind of 
“propensity transmission”: each particle transmits along its trajectory the propensities of 
the particle pair at emission time. Hence the spacetime location of each particle at 
each instant instantiates the individual particle’s properties at that time, but also some 
of the properties of the combined system at previous times. But this is even more 
bizarre —if not plainly incoherent: an entity at some precise spacetime location is 
endowed with propensities belonging to different entities in different spacetime 
locations. In either case, we seem to be bringing the unavoidable non-locality of 
quantum mechanics into the description of the operation of quantum propensities.41  
 The same counterintuitive feature of propensities appears again in the model 
depicted in figure 7 (section 5.2.2) —and this time the resort to the transmission 
mechanism is not even available. The common cause d is the exercise of a propensity 
that is manifested at a, b, s1, and s2. But there is no material transmission at all between 
the cause and any of these events. The particle-pair system at the time of emission has 
                                                     
40 For a discussion of the nature of non-locality in quantum mechanics and its relation to causation, see 
e.g. Berkovitz (2000) 
41 Note, incidentally, that this type of time-lapse between a dispositional property and its manifestation is 
different from the one discussed by Bird (this volume). According to Bird, at least for macroscopic 
dispositional properties, the interaction of an experimental device with the propensity in order to 
yield its manifestation will always take some time —and this gives rise to the possibility of finks and 
antidotes operating within the interval. But the possibility that I am introducing here is different and 
unique to quantum mechanics. The interaction of the particles with the experimental device could be 
instantaneous and take an infinitesimal amount of time, yet there would still be a lapse of (space-)time 
between the possession of the propensity by the combined system and its manifestation at either 
wing. 
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certain nonlocal propensities that get actualised at both wings of the experiment, across 
a spacetime gap. This deeply counterintuitive feature would reappear in a propensity 
based analysis of the model described in section 5.2.4, and might render implausible 
an analysis of these two models in terms of propensities. 
 A way to avoid these problems is to allow that in each of the models presented in 
2.5.1. and 2.5.2. there is a combination of causal relations between occurrent 
properties and manifestations of underlying propensities —of very much the same 
kind that I have applied to the direct-cause model. The arrows out of the common 
cause need not be taken as the manifestation of its propensities. They could instead be 
interpreted as causal influences whereby some occurrent event (c or d) causes a change 
in the propensities of each of the particles. 
 The backwards causation models of Price and De Beauregard described in section 
5.2.5 (depicted in figure 9) could make good use of such combination. In these models 
there is a backwards causal influence whereby the setting-events in the wings partially 
determine the properties of the particle pair —including presumably its propensities— 
at the (earlier) emission event at the source. However, all propensities, unlike some of 
the causes, are forward looking since the possession of the propensity precedes its 
manifestation. And moreover they are not “non-local”, or “bizarre”, in the sense that 
they manifest themselves instantaneously at their precise location when interacted 
with by an appropriate measuring device. There are no spacetime gaps between 
possession and manifestation. From the point of view of the nature of the 
propensities required to make sense of a causal model this might be the most 
satisfying common-cause model of all! 
 Finally models that violate hidden locality, such as the model described in section 
5.2.6 (depicted in figure 10), appeal to a combination of all the features that I have 
been discussing here. The causal influence between the common cause c and the 
effects s1, and s2 can be understood in terms of propensities of the individual particles 
carried by the particles themselves —there is no need here to postulate either 
propensities of the whole composite, nor propensities that can be manifested across 
spacetime gaps. However, the causal influence of the distant setting events a and b 
directly on the effects s1, and s2 (if it is to be understood at all as propensities of the 
measuring devices A and B to generate probability distributions over distant wing 
outcomes) involve the problematic assumption of manifestations of a propensity 
across a spacetime gap, characteristic of “non-local” propensities. Since these events a, 
b are direct causes of s1 and s2, they cannot be understood as causal influences upon 
the propensities of partricles “1” and “2”, but must be understood as exercising their 
‘powers’ directly at a distance. 
7. Conclusions 
In this paper I have taken on, in a preliminary but I hope suggestive enough form, 
what I take to be two of the most important unresolved issues in the philosophy of 
quantum mechanics: What kind of causal models can be given for the EPR 
correlations? What is the nature of quantum propensities? I have argued that Van 
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Fraassen’s 1982 paper constitutes an excellent guide to the first question, and I have 
sketched some ways in which the answers to the first question might then serve to 
illuminate the second. 
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